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I. Introduction
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS) is a constitution for the world's oceans, and as such is
a cornerstone for the rule of law and for the United Nations.2 The
1982 Law of the Sea Treaty is intended to govern the use of
oceans for fishing, shipping, exploration, navigating, and mining.
Since its adoption in 1982, and its entry into force in 1994, the
Convention has provided both unique legal legitimacy and a solid
practical framework for guiding state behavior in the world's
oceans, managing the diverse challenges associated with ocean
I See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS].
2 David B. Sandalow, Law of the Sea Convention: Should the U.S. Join?,
(Brookings Inst., Policy Brief No. 137, 2004).
3 Id.
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space and its uses, and settling the disputes that inevitably arise.4
The Convention has been ratified by 145 nations, including all
permanent members of the United Nations Security Council,
except the United States.5 The United States has failed to ratify
this treaty, even after playing an important role in its modification.6
By failing to ratify the Convention, the United States may have
deprived itself of certain intellectual and real property rights.7
These rights include the right to develop research on ocean
science, the right to process oil and minerals, and the right to
exclude trespassers.8 Although the United States will most likely
remain a dominant figure in the international community, its
failure to ratify the Law of the Sea Convention may render the
convention less effective and leave the United States in a less than
favorable position to protect its interests. The end of 2004 marked
the opening of the Convention for amendments.9 Without U.S.
ratification, the United States will not be guaranteed a permanent
seat on the council for the Convention, thus giving other countries
the sole ability to amend ocean policy against U.S. interests.10
This article will also discuss the historical context in which
UNCLOS was created, including the disputed language of the text,
which may explain the overall reluctance of the United States to
adopt and ratify the Convention. As it is written, UNCLOS III
governs various ocean policies that directly affect the United
States. For the first time, UNCLOS III is open for amendment,
which means member-states may adopt policy contrary to U.S.
interests and the United States will be left without a voice in the
negotiations.
As long as the United States fails to ratify UNCLOS III, the
4 Andrew Grotto, Senate Should Clip the Far Right's Wings and Ratify the Oceans
Treaty, American Progress, Aug. 10, 2004, http://www.americanprogress.org/site/pp.asp
?c=biJRJ8OVF&b=138240.
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 GEORGE V. GALDORISI & KEviN R. VIENNA, BEYOND THE LAW OF THE SEA: NEW
DiREcTIONs FOR U.S. POLICY 2-3 (1997). For the first time in over half a century, the
United States is in a position to accept venerable strategic objectives of its own ocean
policy. The policy found in UNCLOS III contains customary freedoms of navigation
and overflight, which are essential to U.S. economic stability and national security. Id.
9 Sandalow, supra note 2.
10 Id.
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benefits of the Convention will decrease. UNCLOS III has the
potential to act as a unifying document of international protection
in an era of global unrest and distrust. Although the protections
outlined in UNCLOS III are to the advantage of the United States,
the extent of those advantages depends on the extent to which
other nations protect the marine environment. As it stands,
UNCLOS III protects the ocean environment by promoting the
conservation of scarce marine resources by reducing pollution as
well as alien and invasive species, and by protecting the coastal
fisheries. In addition, UNCLOS III protects commercial interests
in the continental shelf and the deep sea by giving each state
exclusive rights to certain areas for mining and scientific research.
Finally, ratification of UNCLOS III ratification would protect U.S.
national security by giving U.S. vessels transit rights throughout
the world. This paper will appraise each obligation and in turn
analyze the U.S. interests protected by the unified international
management of the high seas' fish stock, exclusive economic zone,
and the territorial zones.
II. The Beginning-Formation of an International Agreement
In order to gain an understanding of the complexities of
UNCLOS one must start at its conception. The League of Nations
served as a catalyst in codifying a century's worth of treaties
relating to the international seas. 1 In 1930, forty-eight nation
states met in The Hague at the conference on Progressive
Codification of International Law to discuss the international laws
of the sea.' 2  Very little was decided during this conference;
specifically, the delegates could not agree on:
(1) the breadth of the territorial seas, with twenty states
supporting three miles, four Scandinavian states backing four
miles, and twelve nations advocating six miles; and (2) the right
of a state in a contiguous zone, extending up to twelve miles
from its coast, to take measures to prevent infringement of its
customs and sanitary regulations, a right that was opposed by the
maritime powers of Great Britain, Japan, and the United States.
13
Soon after the end of World War II, approximately two dozen
11 GALDORISI & VIENNA, supra note 8, at 20.
12 Id.
13 Id.
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international treaties were negotiated and signed relating to the
management and conservation of fisheries, the welfare of seamen,
and the prevention of oil pollution.14  In 1945, the increase in
domestic interest in oil led President Harry Truman to unilaterally
broaden U.S. jurisdiction over the natural resources on the
continental shelf, including oil, gas, and minerals. 5 With this
action, President Truman created the first major challenge to the
freedom-of-the-seas doctrine. 6 This first challenge escalated into
a free-for-all, with nations expanding their territorial sea from the
customary three to twelve miles and expanding sovereignty rights
to limit access to other countries. 17  In hopes of remedying this
situation, the first United Nations Conference on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS I) met in Geneva from February to April 1958.18
At this first conference, the eighty-six nation-states and seventy-
nine non-United Nations specialized agencies completed most of
its substantive work by adopting four individual Conventions
relating to the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, the High Seas,
Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High
Seas, and the Continental Shelf. There was also an optional
protocol concerning the settlement of disputes.' 9 This was the first
step toward creating an international consensus on how to regulate
the international seas; however, the Conventions were met with
14 See id. at 21.
15 Id. The Truman Proclamations were issued on Sept. 28, 1945. Id.
16 GALDORISI & VIENNA, supra note 8, at 23. The first Truman Proclamation
expressed urgency in conserving and utilizing the natural resources; with this notion, the
United States viewed the natural resources of both the subsoil and the seabed of the
continental shelf beneath the high seas adjacent to the coast as subject to the jurisdiction
and control of the United States. The second proclamation stressed the need for the
protection of fisheries; the United States created conservation zones contiguous to its
coastal line and explicitly placed these zones under the control of the United States. Id.
at 21.
17 Id. at 23.
18 Constantine A. Stavropoulos, The Third Conference on the Law of the Sea in a
Historical Perspective in THE NEW LAW OF THE SEA 11, 12 (C.L. Rozakis & C.A.
Stephanou eds.1983).
19 GALDORISI & VIENNA, supra note 8, at 23. The Convention on the Continental
Shelf was a direct adaptation of the Truman Proclamations as formulated in the draft of
the International Law Commission. The Convention of the High Seas identified four
protected freedoms inextricably linked to the United States-over-flight, navigation,
laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and fishing-in addition to recognizing
generalized "principles of international law." Id. at 36-37 n.14.
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great criticism. 2° The international community initially criticized
the Conventions on the grounds that they were not up-to-date with
1958 developments. 2' Many states also questioned whether the
four Conventions adopted would actually be effective in managing
the fish stocks and the seabed jurisdictions.22
Two years after the first conference, another conference was
held in hopes of furthering the development of the 1958
Convention.23 The main focus of this Convention was the breadth
of the territorial sea which was left out of UNCLOS I discussion.24
The 1960 Conference met to explore the extent of the territorial
sea and fishery limits. 25  The 1960 Conference was generally
considered a failure because it neither adopted substantive protocol
for the issues presented nor added anything to the 1958
Convention.26 The lack of an international agreement defining the
breadth of the territorial zone led to a series of international
conflicts.27  There was also an increased interest in obtaining
resources such as food and energy from the sea.28 Between 1962
and 1966, the 1958 Convention came into force.29 By 1965, the
United States and the Soviet Union were both skeptical of the
1958 Convention's ability to regulate the ocean; therefore, they
both recognized a need to improve the law of the sea.3' The Soviet
Union formally approached the United States in the summer of
1967 and requested reopening of numerous ocean issues, which
led to the Third Convention on the Law of the Sea.3'
On November 1, 1967, Malta's Ambassador to the United
20 Stavropoulos, supra note 18, at 12.
21 Id.
22 GALDORISI & VIENNA, supra note 8, at 24.
23 Id.
24 ROBERT L. FRIEDHEIM, NEGOTIATING THE NEW OCEAN REGIME 24 (1993).
25 GALDORISI & VIENNA, supra note 8, at 24.
26 Stavropoulus, supra note 18, at 12.
27 GALDORISI &VIENNA, supra note 8, at 24. The most visible conflict was the "cod
wars" between Iceland, Germany, and the United Kingdom. The dispute over the cod
fish stock led to major litigation in the fisheries jurisdiction cases before the International
Court of Justice from 1972 and 1974. Id.
28 Id. at 24.
29 Stavropoulos, supra note 18, at 12.
30 GALDORISI & VIENNA, supra note 8, at 24.
31 Id. at 24.
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Nations, Arvid Pardo, requested that the General Assembly
consider "Peaceful Purposes of the Seabed Lying Beyond the
Limits of National Jurisdiction, and the Use of its Resources in the
Interests of Mankind., 32  At Pardo's appeal, a committee was
formed to consider the legal principles to govern the seabed.33
Pardo's involvement fostered cooperation amongst the nation
states and led to the creation of the Third United Nations
32 Stavropoulos, supra note 18, at 12-13. In his August 1967 speech, Pardo
announced:
In view of the rapid progress in the development of new techniques by
technologically advanced countries, it is feared that the seabed and the ocean
floor will become progressively and competitively subject to national
appropriation and use. This is likely to result in the militarization of the
accessible ocean floor through the establishment of fixed military installations
and in the exploitation and depletion of resources of immense potential benefit
to the world, for the national advantage of technologically developed countries.
It is, therefore, considered that the time has come to declare the seabed and the
ocean floor a common heritage of mankind and that immediate steps should be
taken to draft a treaty embodying the following principles: (a) the seabed and
the ocean floor are not subject to national appropriation in any manner
whatsoever, (b) the use of the seabed and of the ocean floor shall be undertaken
with the aim of safeguarding the interests of mankind. The net financial
benefits derived from the use and exploitation of the seabed and of the ocean
floor shall be used primarily to promote the development of poor countries and
(c) the seabed and the ocean floor shall be reserved exclusively for peaceful
purposes in perpetuity.
An international agency should be established: (a) to assume jurisdiction, as a
trustee for all countries, over the seabed and the ocean floor, (b) to regulate,
supervise and control all activities thereon, and (c) to ensure that the activities
undertaken are consistent with the principles and provisions of the proposed
treaty.
GALDORISI & VIENNA, supra note 8, at 25.
33 GALDORISI & VIENNA, supra note 8, at 25-26. Headed by Ambassador Hamilton
Amerasinghe of Sri Lanka, the committee proposed the Declaration of Principles, which
was unanimously adopted by the General Assembly, stating:
The seabed and ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction (hereinafter referred to as the area), as well as the resources
of the area are the common heritage of a mankind ....
No State or person ... shall claim, exercise or acquire rights with respect to the
area or to its resources incompatible with the international regime to be
established ....
The area shall be used exclusively for peaceful purposes .... The exploration
of the area and the exploitation of its resources shall be carried out for the
benefit of mankind as a whole.
Id. at 26.
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Conference in 1973.34 The purpose for the conference was to
discuss the political and economic realities, scientific development,
and rapid technological advances of the previous decade.35 Many
of the members present at this conference had not participated in
the previous two conferences and they saw a need for a
progressive cooperative development of the law of the sea.3 6
Unlike the 1958 Conference, the 1973 Conference did not have
a draft convention to discuss, but instead had only a list of subjects
and issues relating to the Law of the Sea.37 The United States' first
priority was "preserving the navigation and overflight freedoms
against creeping jurisdictions of coastal states. 38  The other
priorities included conservation of fishery resources and protection
of the marine environment. 39 At this point, the deep seabed mining
was not a high priority, but rather could be sacrificed to achieve
other goals. 4° That smaller developing states could make unilateral
decisions was of major U.S. concern.4'
The 1973 Conference lasted nine years, spanned eleven
sessions, and ended with the adoption of the 1982 Convention.42
The long duration of the conference was mostly due to the
agreement that the members would not vote on an issue until all
attempts at reaching a consensus were exhausted.43 Reaching
a consensus on any subject was made difficult by the presence
of over 157 members, eleven states, and specialized agents
participating in the conference.'
Finally, at the ninth session, the Conference decided to hold
what it thought was its tenth and final session; however, the
34 GALDORISI & VIENNA, supra note 8, at 26.
35 Stavropoulos, supra note 18, at 13.
36 Id. at 13.
37 Stavropoulos, supra note 18, at 15.
38 GALDORISI & VIENNA, supra note 8, at 27.
39 Id. at 27.
40 Id. at 25.
41 Id. at 29, 34. The developing states loosely formed G-77 to oppose the
customary freedom of the seas which they believed was "no more than a code word for
the protection of the naval requirements of the great powers." Id. at 29.
42 Stavropoulos, supra note 18, at 15-16.
43 Id. at 15.
44 Id. at 14.
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United States had other plans.45 On the eve of the tenth session in
1981, the U.S. Department of State issued a statement indicating
that the U.S. representative would seek to ensure that the
negotiations did not end until after the U.S. government reviewed
the policy in UNCLOS 111.46 The mining industry, Congress, and
the American public greatly criticized the seabeds section during
the draft convention.47 According to U.S. officials, the United
States did not feel bound to the draft convention because it was
informal in character and the draft had no real influence on any of
the member states.48
III. The Language-Amendments, Changes, and
Implementation
To further understand the dispute about the Law of the Sea one
must look to the actual language of the Convention. UNCLOS III
initiated an international consensus as to what jurisdiction states
may exercise along their coasts and assigns certain duties among
states in all marine areas.49 It also gives coastal states sovereignty
for the purpose of exploring, exploiting, preserving, conserving,
and managing the natural resources in an exclusive economic zone
and the contiguous zone.5" UNCLOS III provides that the
exclusive economic zone (EEZ) may extend some 200 nautical
miles off the coast of a state.5' The contiguous zone is twenty-four
nautical miles from the coast baselines that allow the states limited
control to regulate those infringements of its customs, fiscal,
immigration, and sanitary laws.52 The Convention also regulates
45 Id. at 16.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 16-17. Part XI is the seabed section of the draft convention. After the
United States reviewed the draft, it submitted eighteen pages indicating that the
responsibility of ensuring compliance with the mining system from shifted seabed
authority to individual states. Id. at 17.
48 Stavropoulos, supra note 18, at 18.
49 Accession to the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention and Ratification of the 1994
Agreement Amending Part XI of the Law of the Sea, Testimony Before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, 106th Cong. (2003) (statement of William H. Taft, Legal
Adviser, U.S. Dept. of State).
50 Id. at 1.
51 Id.
52 Id.
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the interaction of the signatory states.53 By doing so, the
Convention balances the interests of individual states in their own
coasts and the freedom of other states to use the ocean space
without interference. 4 The language of the Convention stresses
the importance of marine research and in doing so "affirms the
right of all states to conduct marine scientific research."55 Finally,
the Convention creates a venue "to promote compliance with its
provisions and the peaceful settlement of disputes."56 Although
most of the provisions in UNCLOS III benefit the United States,
the United States would be slow to adopt the Convention.57
Part XI regulates the "Area," a section of the international
seabed that may only be used for peaceful purposes.5 8 The Area
was brought about in the Convention as a provision to implement
the Common Heritage of Mankind principle.59
Industry interest in mining the deep seabed emerged during the
late 1960s as it became more apparent that mining the mineral
deposits on the ocean floor was a potentially lucrative venture.60
Deep seabed mining did not exist when Part XI was negotiated.6'
53 Id.
54 Id. With this regulation, the Convention is able to protect the military and
commercial navigation interests in areas under coastal state jurisdiction and on the high
seas. This stipulation allows all ships and aircrafts to traverse (by air, land, or sea) straits
used for international navigation and archipelagos. Id.
55 Id. By granting these rights, the states must cooperate in sharing the scientific
research with one another. The United States conducts more scientific research in
foreign waters than almost all other countries combined. Id.
56 Id. The compliance procedures are somewhat flexible, providing options as to
the appropriate means and forums to settle the disputes and allowing for an option to
exclude matters vital to national business (such as maritime boundaries, military
activities, and EEZ management). The Clinton Administration recommended that the
United States opt for all three exclusions. Prior to U.S. negotiations, certain countries
were petitioning for a narrower scope of exclusions in military disputes; however, the
United States was able to achieve the broader exceptions. Id.
57 ROZAKIS & STEPHANOU, supra note 18, at 270.
58 See UNCLOS, supra note 1, at 445.
59 Constantine A. Stephanou, A European Perception of the Attitude of the United
States at Final Stage of UNCLOS III with Respect to the Exploitation of the Deep Sea
Bed, in THE NEW LAW OF THE SEA 259, 207 (C.L Rozakis & C.A. Stephanou, eds. 1983).
See supra, text accompanying note 32 and infra text accompanying note 80 and 83 for
explanation of Common Heritage of Mankind.
60 GALDORISI &VIENNA, supra note 8, at 75.
61 Id. at 76.
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Provisions of Part XI were negotiated with the hopes that mining
would become a commercial reality before the end of the
century.62 However, this did not come to fruition because altered
market conditions led to the exploitation and improved use of
land-based sources.63 In the early 1980s, analysts speculated that
the mining of cobalt, manganese, nickel, copper, and other
minerals from the deep seabed would rapidly increase. 64 However,
recent economic conditions indicate that the feasibility of deep
seabed mining is bleak; in fact, deep seabed mining may not be
viable before 2025.65 If seabed mining becomes more feasible, it
is speculated that the United States has more than enough potential
mineral deposits located within the national 200-mile exclusive
economic zone to render domestic industry a success.66
The problem with the high concentration of mineral deposits in
the seabed is not that the United States will deplete the
resources-although that is something of an issue not germane to
this paper-the real issue at hand is that, with such a high
concentration other nations may try to take advantage of those
resources. The 1982 Convention attempted to address this
particular issue with article 137 which states in pertinent part that
"[n]o State shall claim or exercise sovereignty or sovereign rights
over any part of the Area or its resources, nor shall any State or
natural or juridical person appropriate any part thereof. No such
claim or exercise of sovereignty or sovereign rights nor such
appropriation shall be recognized. ' ' 67  This stipulation led the
United States to question the effect of customary law on a third
state, a state not directly involved in the ratification of the
62 Id.
63 Id. at 76.
64 Id. at 75. Scientists at Massachusetts Institute of Technology predicted that the
base case return on investment for deep seabed mining would be eighteen percent. Id.
65 GALDORISI &VIENNA, supra note 8, at 76. Professor Jonathan Charnery of
Vanderbilt University indicates that there are cheaper land-based substitutes to deep
seabed minerals, hence the lack of demand for those minerals found in the ocean floor.
Id. Some assume that without an artificial government subsidy, deep seabed mining will
not become economically feasible until much later in this century. Id.
66 Id. at 76. Promising locations have been identified by several companies that
wish to protect their investments for the time when seabed mining becomes economical.
Id.
67 UNCLOS, supra note 1, at 446.
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Convention.68 On its face, the language indicates those non-
participant states would also be subject to the inadmissibility of
sovereign rights.6 9 However, the Law of Treaties7" indicates that
"[a]n obligation arises for a third state from a provision of a treaty
if the parties to the treaty intend the provision to be the means of
establishing the obligation and the third state expressly accepts
that obligation in writing. '
71
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, entering into
force in 1980, codified previously established international
customary law on treaties and added clarification where needed.72
Most states are parties, and those states that have not signed onto
the Vienna Convention-including the United States-recognize
principles of the Convention as binding. 73 'With Article 137 and
the enforcement of the Vienna Convention, it appears that the Law
of the Sea Convention cannot be applied to third states without
their expressed acquiescence to refrain from exercising their
sovereign rights.74  The Vienna Convention goes on to say in
Article 38 that "[n]othing in articles 34 to 37 precludes a rule set
forth in a treaty from becoming binding upon a third state as a
customary rule of international law, recognized as such. ' 75 This
Article can be interpreted in two distinct ways. First, it can be
read to indicate compliance with the Syrian Amendment of the
Vienna Conference.76 Under the Syrian Amendment, if a state did
not accept a rule as customary, the Convention could not take
away its sovereign rights.77 The second interpretation conforms
68 Stephanou, supra note 59, at 270.
69 GALDORISI & VIENNA, supra note 8, at 76.
70 The Law of the Treaties of the Vienna Convention went into force on Jan. 27,
1980. RozAKis & STAVROPOULUS, supra note 18, at 272.
71 Id.
72 International Law Commission: Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties,
http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/treaties.htm.
73 Id. at 1. The United States opted not to sign the Vienna Convention because it
already had similar laws in place. Id.
74 Stephanou, supra note 59, at 272-73.
75 Id. at 27 1.
76 Id. at 272-73.
77 Id. at 273. Smaller developing countries, somewhat naively, supported the
Syrian amendment, which in fact limited the scope of future agreements that would have
been in their favor. See id.
2006]
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more to international community interests.7" In this view, if those
states that voted for it and those that abstained from voting ratified
the Law of the Sea, the United States would not have hesitated to
consider such a joint management of resources and inadmissibility
of sovereign rights as customary rules.79 The customary law
contains the principle of the Common Heritage of Mankind-a
state, regardless of its status within the Convention, must adhere to
the concept that certain aspects of the sea are universal.8 0
IV. The Stubborn View
A. General Reluctance
The United States' reluctance to adopt the 1982 draft treaty
could be directly related to the rights and privileges it received
prior to the enforcement of the Convention. An act titled "Deep
Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act," signed by President Jimmy
Carter in 1980, was to remain in effect until the Convention on
Law of the Sea came into force in the United States.81 Essentially,
the idea was that there would be no real contradiction between the
attitudes of the United States and of those states in compliance
with the rules, regulations, and procedures of UNCLOS 111.82 The
difference between the U.S. act and UNCLOS III was that the
U.S. act gave the authority to grant exploration licenses and
exploitation permits that were valid prior to the authorization dates
78 Id. at 273.
79 See Stephanou, supra note 59, at 273.
80 Id. at 269. See also Steven J. Molitor, The Provisional Understanding
Regarding Deep Seabed Matters: An Ill-Conceived Regime for U.S. Deep Seabed
Mining, 20 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 223, 228 (1987). The Common Heritage of Mankind has
its foundation in the concepts of seventeenth century scholar Grotius. The idea is that the
attributes of nature should be shared equitably throughout the earth; countries must rely
on others to supply the needs that they cannot meet themselves. Some 400 years later,
Ambassador Pardo of Malta redefined Grotius' view of oceanic common heritage to
include the resources outside national jurisdiction areas. UNCLOS III makes itself the
overseer of the common heritage for the 200 nautical miles of the exclusive economic
zone. Id.
81 Stephanou, supra note 59, at 267. President Carter stated that the agreement was
comparable to the actual UNCLOS III because both acknowledge that the deep seabed
resources belong to the Common Heritage of Mankind. He also dictated that portions of
the revenue be set aside for the needs of developing countries, but did not extend
sovereignty of the United States to parts of the Area. Id.
82 See id. at 267.
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in UNCLOS III.83
The U.S. attitude toward the 1982 Convention was mostly due
to the change of administration and their corresponding economic
views. The U.S. policy entering UNCLOS III negotiations was
based on a Report of the Stratton Commission.8 ' This report called
for a regulatory scheme to prevent the pollution by ocean use.
8 6
The report also stressed the need for the U.S. Navy to carry out its
duty to provide national defense at sea. 87  Finally, the report
indicated that international stability was directly related to a stable
economy; therefore, it promoted deep seabed mining development
and sharing ocean use with developing nations.88 Soon after
President Ronald Reagan's inauguration in January 1981, he
issued a statement on the Law of the Sea.89 In his statement,
Reagan indicated that the United States agreed with and supported
the Convention principles that reflect U.S. interests, but would not
support those which were against U.S., interests, particularly Part
XI concerning deep seabed mining. 9 President Reagan indicated
that six objectives needed to be met in order to amend Part XI so
that the United States could fully support the 1982 Convention. 9'
83 Id. at 267. The United States granted exploration licenses to be valid not earlier
than June 1, 1981, and granted exploitation permits not earlier than Jan. 1, 1988. By
granting these rights, the United States exercised sovereign rights in the Area. Id.
84 See CHARLES L.O. BUDERI & DAVID D. CORAN, PERSPECTIVES ON US POLICY
TOWARD THE LAW OF THE SEA: PRELUDE TO THE FINAL SESSION OF THE THIRD U.N.
CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 9 (1985).
85 GALDORISI & VIENNA, supra note 8, at 27. The Marine Resources and
Engineering Development Act of 1966 (P.L. 89-454) stated U.S. marine policy
objectives, created a National Council on Marine Resources and Engineering
Development, and set up a presidential Commission on Marine Science, Engineering,
and Resources. This fifteen-member Commission came to be known as the "Stratton
Commission" after Dr. Julius A. Stratton, retired President of Massachusetts Institute of
Technology and Chairman of the Board of the Ford Foundation, who was appointed its
Chairman in 1967 by President Lyndon Johnson. Id. at 126-29.
86 Id. at 27. "Ocean use" refers to navigational purposes (recreational and defense),
scientific research of the actual waters and seabed, and finally other pollution producing
activity.
87 Id. at 27.
88 Id. at 27-28.
89 BUDERI & CORAN, supra note 84, at 9.
90 Id. at 15. The draft treaty specified that the United States would be paying a high
price with the seabed for something inexpensive like navigation rights. See id. at 19 and
Stavropoulose, supra note 18 at 15-20 for further discussion.
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Those objectives were to ensure a treaty that:
Would not deter development of any deep seabed mineral
resources to meet national and world demand;
Would assure national assets to these resources by current, and
future qualified entities, to enhance U.S. security of supply, to
avoid monopolization of the resources by the operating arm of
the international authority, and to promote the economic
development of the resources;
Would provide a decision-making role in the deep seabed
regime that fairly reflects and effectively protects the political
and economic interests and financial contributions of
participating states;
Would not allow for amendments to come into force without
approval of the participating states, including in our case the
advice and consent of the Senate;
Would not set other undesirable precedents for International
organizations; and
Would be likely to receive the advice and consent of the Senate.
In this regard the Convention should not contain provisions for
the mandatory transfer of private technology and participation
by and funding for national liberation movements. 9
2
The first objective indicates that the United States believed its
interests and the interests of the majority of the participating
nations would be best served by exploiting the natural resources of
the deep seabed and placing such resources on the market. 9
3
Because U.S. reviewers believed that several provisions of the
draft treaty discouraged the development of deep seabed mineral
resources, the United States saw a need for several revisions.94
91 Id. at 9. The United States gave notice that it would not tolerate any
infringements on its rights and freedoms by any nation. Therefore, other nations viewed
the United States as making unilateral actions not in accordance with UNCLOS
participants. Id. E.D. Brown, Deep Sea Mining: The Consequences of Failure to Agree
at UNCLOS III, The New Law of the Sea 209, 210 (C.L Rozakis & C.A. Stephanou,
eds., 1983).
92 Id. at 9-10.
93 BUDERI & CORAN, supra note 84, at 16.
94 Id. at 16-17. In fact the provisions that the United States believed needed
improvement were: (1) the production policies of the Authority, which place other
priorities over economic efficiency; (2) limits on availability of minerals for global
consumption; (3) the cap of mining operations per country; (4) the heavy financial
burden on the industrialized countries; and (5) administrative and regulatory discretion
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Second, the United States believed that all qualified applicants
should be granted mining contracts depending on whether they
satisfy objective qualifications standards, and that an applicant
should not be rejected unless a consensus of technical experts
deem the applicant improper. 95 Also, the United States wanted to
ensure that private mining operations could continue to operate
independently.96 Third, because the United States would be one of
the larger contributors to the Seabed Authority and to the financing
of the Enterprise, and a large. potential consumer and investor of
private deep seabed mining operations, they wanted a significant
role in decision-making regarding such mining.97 According to the
draft treaty, there would be a one-nation/one-vote assembly which
would leave the United States without the ability to control or
influence its economic and political interests.9" The fourth
objective indicates that as the draft treaty is written, only two-
thirds of the participating states would have to approve an
amendment in order for it to be binding on all states.99 The fifth
objective addresses President Reagan's misgivings about potential
adverse precedents with regard to production limits, protection of
land-based minerals, and the mandatory transfer of technology.' °
Finally, the sixth objective illustrates two of the major concerns of
Congress and the Reagan Administration: the mandatory transfer
of private technology and participation by and funding for national
liberation movements. °1 With so many objections to the draft
that could lead to interference in mining operations by imposing over-burdensome
regulations. Id. at 17.
95 Id. at 17.
96 Id. The draft treaty creates a system of privileges which tends to discriminate
against the private side of the parallel system, giving substantial competitive advantages
to a supranational mining company, the Enterprise. The rational private companies are
left with only two options: enter into a joint-venture with the Enterprise or enter into
similar ventures with other developing countries. This action would either exclude U.S.
access to deep seabed minerals through its private companies or leave the Enterprise to
create a monopoly over deep seabed minerals. Id. at 17-18.
97 BUDERI & CORAN, supra note 84, at 18.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 18. Although it is possible to withdraw from the agreement, as in any
investment if an amendment is made that is unfavorable, the seceding state that has
invested a large amount of capital in the development of deep seabed mining through the
international treaty may lose more by leaving the treaty. Id. at 18-19.
100 Id. at 19.
101 Id.
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treaty, the United States would need more time and analysis before
it would consider ratification of the Convention.
B. Changed View: Shift in the International Currents
The end of the Cold War"°2 and the growing reliance of free
market principles and political and economic changes in the
international sphere prompted the realization that the seabed
mining regime of the Convention needed to be altered.13 The
Chairman of the First Committee at UNCLOS III indicated that the
impact of the seabed production would be most evident in the
drastic redistribution of production and production revenues.'
°4
Javier Perez de Cuellar, the Secretary-General of the United
Nations, sought a better consensus regarding the deep seabed
mining issue. In July 1990, he called for a meeting between the
representatives of some of the major participants of the UNCLOS
negotiations process.' °5 The principle behind the deep seabed
mining provision was to encourage economic growth; however,
such growth would not occur with Part XI as it was written." 6
Amendments were necessary.'0 7  Between 1990 and 1994,
Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar-followed by his successor,
Boutros Boutros Ghali-held fifteen meetings to seek the
provisions necessary to create a more workable regime for
developing and developed nations regarding the deep seabed.0 8
The first phase of negotiations included the identification of the
issues and the approach to be taken in examining those issues,
102 GALDORISI & VIENNA, supra note 8, at 21. As bitter ideological enemies, the
United States and the Soviet Union were brought together to negotiate the major aspects
of the law of the sea. The Soviets focused on the coastal defense, foreign shipping of its
seaborne commerce, and the protection of its economy. Id. at 24 and 30-34.
103 Id. at 25. Informal negotiations began during the administration of George H.W.
Bush under the auspices of the United Nations Secretary-General. Id. at 116-17.
104 JAMES WANG, OCEAN LAW AND POLITICS 187-188 (1992). The deep sea-bed
mining was not only a problem of the developing countries attempting to receive gains at
the detriment to the Western industrialized nations, but also an effort to remedy the
potential severe economic dislocation as a result of the mining at will of technologically
advanced nations. Id.
105 GALDORISI &VIENNA, supra note 8, at 64.
106 Id.
107 See id. at 65. United States' UN Ambassador Thomas Pickering indicated U.S.
support, but also stressed U.S. reluctance to support Part XI as it was written. id.
108 Id. at 64.
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including potential solutions. °9  The second phase was an
enhancement of the consensus reached in the first phase."' Under
the leadership of Ambassador Pickering, the United States played
an active role in coming to a consensus over the deep seabed."' In
August of 1993, soon after Pickering took the lead, the "Boat
Paper" proposal appeared. 112 This proposal contained the substantive
changes and procedural requirements to satisfy the negotiating
members' requests and the amendment process.' The consensus
found in the "Boat Paper" proposal led to the 1994 Agreement. 114
C. A Hopeful Resolution: The 1994 Agreement
On October 7, 1994, President Bill Clinton submitted
UNCLOS and the 1994 Agreement to the U.S. Senate for advice
and consent.' The President stressed six key reasons for the
Senate to approve UNCLOS:
(1) The Convention advances the interests of the United States
as a global maritime power; (2) The Convention advances the
interest of the Unites States as a coastal state; (3) The
Convention promotes continuing improvement in the health of
the world's oceans; (4) The Convention set forth criteria and
procedures to promote access to marine areas; (5) The
Convention facilitates solutions to the increasingly complex
problems of the uses of the oceans; and (6) The Convention
implements a dispute settlement provision. 116
The 1994 Agreement was adopted by the General Assembly at
a Special Resumed Session on July 28, 1994."' The Agreement
was signed by the United States and contains legally binding
109 Id.
110 GALDORISI &VIENNA, supra note 8, at 64. There was a general agreement that
any amendments to UNCLOS had to be made prior to the 1982 Convention entered into
force in order to circumvent the constitutional amendment-type process set forth in the
Convention. Id.
'11 Id. at65.
112 Id. The "Boat Paper" was an anonymous compromise proposal by a group of
developing and developed countries in August of 1993.
113 GALDORISI & VIENNA, supra note 8, at 65.
114 Id.
115 Id. at 173.
116 Id. at 195-97.
117 Id. at 65.
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changes to Part XI. 118 It is applied and interpreted together with
the Convention as a single document. As of October 2003, the
Agreement was signed by ninety-nine nations and some "115
states and the European Community consented to be bound by the
Agreement."' 19
The 1994 Agreement overhauls the decision-making procedures
of Part XI to appease the United States and others with major
economic interests in deep seabed mining. 120  According to
William H. Taft, "the Agreement also guarantees a seat for the
United States on the critical decision-making body and requires
financial decisions to be based on a consensus of major
contributors."' 121  The Agreement reduces the authority of the
organization to administer the mining regime, and connects the
activation and operation of institutions to the actual development
of concrete interests in seabed mining. 122 The United States and a
few of its allies can block the future decision to activate the
Enterprise, and any activities on its part will be subject to the same
Convention requirements as other commercial enterprises.22 The
Agreement also removes all requirements for mandatory transfer
of technology and production controls that were contained in the
original Convention. 124  The Agreement also adds a provision
requiring consideration of the environmental impact of deep
seabed mining. 125  Finally, the Agreement provides for the
118 Id.
119 The U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (T. Doc. 103-39): Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 108th Cong. 90 (2003) (statement of William H.
Taft, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dept. of State) [hereinafter The U.N. Convention on the Law of
the Sea].
120 Id.
121 Id. at 94. Taft also notes that "the Agreement restructures the deep seabed
regime to encompass free market principles." Id.
122 Wesley S. Scholz, Observations on the Draft Agreement Reforming the Deep
Seabed Mining Provisions of the Law of the Sea Convention, in 1994 RHODES PAPERS:
ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION 71-72 (Myron H. Nordquist &
John Norton Moore eds., 1995).
123 Id. at 72. States are not obligated to finance the Enterprise, and subsidies
inconsistent with WTO/GATT are forbidden. Gregory A. French, Proposed Revision of
Part XI: Current Changes and Future Considerations, in 1994 RHODES PAPERS: ENTRY
INTO FORCE OF THE LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION 148 (Myron H. Nordquist & John
Norton Moore eds., 1995).
124 See Scholz, supra note 122, at 72.
125 Id. at 71.
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grandfathering of seabed mine site claims that were established on
the basis of exploration already conducted by companies holding
U.S. licenses on the basis of arrangements "similar to and no less
favorable than" the best terms granted to previous claimants.
12 6
V. Deep Seabed Mining
The revised Agreement limits the full application of the deep
seabed regime to the point of economic viability. 127  U.S.
companies were not certified as having the ability to participate as
pioneer investors in the Agreement entering into force because the
United States has not signed UNCLOS. 28 Pioneer investors are
those states that are signatories to UNCLOS III and have the
opportunity to explore the deep seabed. 129 The new agreement
allows U.S. companies to have the same rights as pioneer investors
if they meet certain technical requirements. 130 In this instance, the
United States was put in the same position as potential deep
seabed-mining states.1 31 The United States is also guaranteed a
position on the Council should it sign UNCLOS. 32
126 The U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 119, at 94. The
Agreement entered into force on Nov. 16, 1998. Id.
127 Jonathan Charney, Entry Into Force of the 1982 Convention on the Law of the
Sea, 35 VA. J. INT'L L. 381, 392 (1995). The Agreement could only be entered into force
with forty state parties, including the seven original investor states (five of which must
be developed states). Id.
128 Id. at 392-93.
129 Id.
130 Id. at 393. As Charney further notes, "by performing this gesture, the United
States has been allowed to eliminate one negative ramification of not signing UNCLOS."
Id.
131 Id. International Seabed Authority (ISA) decision approvals must be based upon
the two-thirds affirmative vote of Council members, and no chamber may be majority-
opposed. As Charney continues, the ISA Council is composed of four chambers, which
consist of the following:
(1) states that have invested in deep sea bed mining; (2) states that are
consumers of the categories of minerals to be derived from the deep seabed; (3)
states that are land-based producers of minerals expected to be derived from the
deep seabed; and (4) states representing developing countries selected on the
basis of special interests and geographical distributions.
Id.
132 Id. at 393-94. It is possible for other developed countries to be elected to the
Council to ensure equitable geographical representation, but the states are not included in
the four chambers. Id. at 394. The basic composition of ISA Council and voting
structure was designed to ensure that the decisions made by ISA reflect an international
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
There are many misconceptions as to what the signing of
UNCLOS would mean for the United States and deep seabed
mining. It is argued that by ratifying UNCLOS, including the
Agreement, states will inevitably have to discontinue their
unilateral attempts at deep seabed mining. 133 However, this is
unfounded as the law of the deep seabed was intentionally not
settled in order to produce solid negotiations of the sort that
resulted in UNCLOS. 134  Most, if not all, of the potential deep
seabed mining nations are dedicated to the adoption of UNCLOS
and the Agreement. 35 The potential deep seabed mining countries
understand that there is a lack of economic viability in the present
deep seabed mining industry, and "it is inconceivable that the
necessary financial markets would support unilateral mining if it is
contrary to the principles" of UNCLOS. 136
The other issue that could present slight problems in the deep
seabed mining framework is the dual regimes developed under
UNCLOS and the Agreement.137 Some states adopted the original
Part XI, whereas others, such as the United States, negotiated and
adopted the 1994 Agreement. 38  However, the dual system is
unlikely because most nations supported the 1994 Agreement and
no state voted against it.139 The only possibility of a dual regime
will arise if the United States fails to ratify the Agreement and then
unilaterally attempts to subsidize its own industry.140
The question then arose as to the accessibility of the nodules of
the deep seabed-particularly the unlimited access of private
entities not signatories on UNCLOS.14' The fear was that such
consensus. Id.
133 Charney, supra note 127, at 397.
134 Id. The domestic legislation in the United States represents the ambiguous state
of law and accepts the common heritage of mankind. See infra page 17.
135 Id. at 398.
136 Id.
137 See id. at 398-99.
138 Id. at 399-400.
139 Charney, supra note 127, at 400. Even the G-77 countries (smaller developing
countries), which one would assume might view the Agreement as objectionable,
supported the Agreement. Id.
140 Id. It is unlikely that the United States would act in such a manner because the
companies would seek refuge in member states and not in the United States. Id.
141 FRIEDHEIM, supra note 24, at 248.
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unlimited access would create a shift in the market, eroding the
stability of the seabed market.4 2  Developing nations were
opposed to the limited access provisions because they would drive
a technological and economic gap between the developed and
developing nations. 43  In this instance, those nations already
producing land-based minerals would most likely choose to protect
themselves from the unlimited supply of deep seabed minerals by
lowering the prices of the land-based minerals.'"
Most of the G-77 considered political control of economic
activity to be the solution to the instability of the seabed market;
many nations consequently requested production controls.'45
However, those countries already involved in mining supported a
free market system because of the uncertainty in the deep seabed
potential market.'46 The rift in the negotiations occurred when the
potential miner nations feared great political constraints to limit
the possibility of failure would create a less friendly market.
4 7
However, other nations feared that ocean mining would be
overburdened and force mineral prices to fluctuate. 4 8 Because of
this fear, these nations required a limited market in which the
political entity would rule on the matter as circumstances arose,
leaving the political entity rather than the demand for the minerals
as the driving force in the market. 
49
Part XI of the Convention pertains directly to individual
seabed mining companies. 5 ° If a company is sponsored by a
member state, state sponsorship presupposes some general
142 Id.
143 Id.
144 Id. at 248-49.
145 Id. at 249. Production control was similar to the New International Economic
Order. Id.
146 FRIEDHEIM, supra note 24, at 249. By having a free market system, individual
nations are allowed unregulated development with little to no guidelines. The
uncertainty in the deep seabed market is great because large capital, new technology, and
knowledge are required before such a market can become viable; hence, any market
numbers are purely estimates. Id,
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 Id. at 248-49. Until the Reagan Administration entered into the negotiations, it
appeared that the production control had the support of the G-77 and was to be the
market system of choice by the majority. Id. at 249.
150 UNCLOS, supra note 1, art. 139.
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supervisory duties, allowing a company to apply for exclusive or
exploitation rights to mine along the international seabed. 5' The
private property rights of those companies depend on the authority
of international law to grant these exclusive and/or exploitation
rights.'52 Granting of these rights was in response to the position
that exclusive mining rights over a particular length of time and
area are a necessary precondition to private investment in the
development of nonliving resources found in the seabed.'53 The
grant of private access to international organizations for the
attainment of mining rights induces more provisions for property
and economic rights of the private entities. 15 4 In order to explore
the continental shelf, mining companies must acquire exclusive
mining rights of a specific area through a contract.'55
VI. Geographical
The Law of the Sea Convention grants a comprehensive
framework for the maintenance of the marine environment.'56
Under the Convention, states are mandated to take measures to
concentrate on pollution, alien and invasive species, and the
conservation and management of the coastal fisheries.'57 The
states are also obligated to cooperate in the management of the
high seas fish stock, which migrate through the exclusive
economic and territorial zones.'58 The environmental protections
outlined in UNCLOS III are to the advantage of the United States,
which already exceeds these standards, but the success of the
program depends on the extent other nations protect the marine
environment. 5 9 The United States cannot rely on any protections
151 Bernard H. Oxman, Human Rights and the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 399,416 (1997) (explaining that the Seabed
Authority grants these rights to individual companies to mine along the international
seabed area beyond the continental shelf).
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 Id. at 416-17.
155 Id. at 418. The Convention requires that the contract contain a security of tenure
and specific substantive and procedural guidelines for imposing penalties for breaches of
the contract or disobeying the dispute settlement body. Id.
156 Sandalow, supra note 2, at 6.
157 Id.
158 Id.
159 Id.
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of UNCLOS III, as it is not yet a party to the Convention. 60
According to U.S. Senator Richard Lugar, there are two
developments that make the U.S. ratification even more urgent.' 6
1
First, Russia has laid a claim to areas near the Arctic Ocean seabed
far beyond the exclusive economic zone to secure possible oil and
gas reserves. 62 Second, the treaty is now open for amendment and
member countries may propose amendments unfavorable to U.S.
interests. 163
There are three types of jurisdictional zones involved in
UNCLOS. 64 Three relevant geographical issues are the width of
the zones, the baselines in which the breadth of the zones are
measured, and the seaward and lateral limits of the zones. 165
Baselines refer to the physical character of the coast and are
important aspects of the jurisdiction of a state. 66 Delimitation of
seaward boundaries between individual states with opposite or
adjacent coasts utilizes baselines. 167  The formation of the
boundaries is delineated in Articles 5 through 14 of UNCLOS.168
However, despite the unambiguous language found in UNCLOS,
there remains inconsistent application of the baseline boundaries. 69
The normal baselines are drawn along the natural existing
boundaries of islands and along the mainland coast.17° Frequently,
controversies arise in deciding baseline delimitations relating to
160 Id. at 1-2.
161 Senator Richard Lugar, Senate Should Ratify Law of the Sea in the Interest of our
National Defense, NAVY TIMES, Mar. 8, 2004, http://lugar.senate.gov/sfrc/opeds
.html#navyl.
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 Lewis Alexander, Baseline Delimitations and Maritime Boundaries, 23 VA. J.
INT'L. L. 503 (1983).
165 Id. at 504.
166 Id. at 505.
167 Id. at 505.
168 Id. at 504. Article V refers to normal baselines-lines that follow the low-water
line along the coasts. Article VII pertains to the straight baselines when the coastline's
form is irregular. Id.
169 Alexander, supra note 164, at 504.
170 Id. The Convention sets the island boundaries as those boundaries which are
above the waterline at high tide. However, it is sometimes difficult to determine the
natural boundary and the precision sought in Article V is not often met. Id.
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bays and subsidiaries.' 7' The United States has been in litigation
with other coastal states to determine the official U.S. coastline. 1
72
When creating a straight baseline, Article 7 of UNCLOS
provides that the specialized economic interests of a region may be
considered in delimiting the baseline.'73 The Convention indicates
that a baseline may not be applied in such a way that it "cut[s] off
the territorial sea of another state from the high seas or an
exclusive economic zone."'' 74  Article 7 failed to address the
possibility of a country's coastline being cut off from the high seas
and the economic zones. 175  The straight baseline system can be
problematic in that baselines are sometimes not straight because of
the ragged character of the borders.'76The baseline boundaries determine the maritime boundaries
between states with opposite or adjacent coastlines. 177 A boundary
may divide the internal waters of two states, as in the case of the
United States-Canada boundary in Passamaquoddy bay.178  A
boundary may also separate the waters of two nations like the
United States-Canada boundary of the Gulf of Maine. 179 Finally,
the boundaries could be further seaward and serve to separate
continental shelves from one another or separate two exclusive
economic or fishery zones.
180
The fundamentals of maritime boundary delimitation are
rooted in equitable solutions. 181 Possible methods for delimitation
171 Id.
172 Id. at 512. There are a number of ambiguities and uncertainties associated with
the Convention, specifically including where the presence of screening islands across the
mouth of a bay creates no detectable natural entrance, as is the case with the Mississippi
Sound opening into the Gulf of Mexico between Bay St. Louis and Mobile Bay. Id.
173 Id. at 516. It may be difficult to make arguments for especially long baselines
when coastal states have not adopted maritime customs. Alexander, supra note 164, at
516 (citing UNCLOS art. 7(5)).
174 Alexander, supra note 164, at 516 (citing the UNCLOS art. 7(6)).
175 See id. (pointing out that this could occur when the navigation conduit to a
country's only major port is possibly enclosed within another state's straight baseline
regime).
176 Id.
177 Id. at 521.
178 Id. at 521-22.
179 Id. at 522.
180 Alexander, supra note 164, at 522.
181 Id.
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include: "(1) an equidistant or modified equidistant line; (2) a line
perpendicular to the general direction of the coast; and (3) a
boundary based on proportionality." '82 The territorial boundaries
may differ along one baseline. 8 3  For example, one particular
boundary can be drawn utilizing more than one method of
delimination 84
Countries may turn to an agreement in order to modify the
baselines along their coasts.185 The United States-Cuba maritime
boundary negotiation ended with the successful creation of an
artificial border. 86 The controversy began when Cuba adopted a
straight baseline system around its coast and the United States
ignored Cuba's coastline and failed to adopt any baseline
system. 187 As a result, the negotiations, which entailed technical
debates, established a provisional artificial maritime boundary
drawn off the coast of Florida.188  According to a report on
maritime boundaries of the United States, the halfway line was
determined by using the Cuban straight baselines and the artificial
construction lines of the United States.8 9 Another equidistant line
was formed using the base points on the low-water line of the
coasts of the United States and Cuba.1 90 A middle line was then
created between the two established lines that resulted not in
equidistance, but rather a midpoint between the two lines.191 Another
example of the United States creating borders in equidistance is the
United States-Mexican boundary.1 92 The United States simplified
the boundary lines through an equal exchange of territory in the
182 Id.
183 Id. For example, the territorial sea boundary between Denmark and Sweden that
extends for a distance through the Oresund Sound is based on equidistance, and the
central portion is a negotiated boundary. Id.
184 Id.
185 Alexander, supra note 164, at 529.
186 Id.
187 Id.
188 Id.
189 Id. (citing Robert Smith, The Maritime Boundaries of the United States, 71 GEO.
REv. 395,401-02 (1981)).
190 Alexander, supra note 164, at 529.
191 Id. at 522.
192 Id. at 531.
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boundary area with Mexico. 9 3  Under this agreement, the
territorial sea boundary in the Gulf of Mexico was determined to
terminate at the center or the mouth of the Rio Grande River,
regardless of the tendency of the river mouth to zigzag.' 94 The
established baseline delimitation may be changed by one of
the negotiating parties to the boundary settlement; this baseline
delimitation would be critical in deciding the maritime boundary.'95
For example, Russia will soon be entering negotiations with the
members of UNCLOS III to expand its exclusive economic zones
into the Arctic Ocean. 1
96
In the end it appears that two separate trends exist in
baseline delimitations.' 97 The first trend is known as "creeping
jurisdiction." This occurs when countries expand their territory
just a minimal distance, in contrast to the allotted 200 nautical
miles for the economic zone. 198 The Convention was drafted in
such a manner that such minimal adjustments would not violate a
state's compliance.'99 The second trend is marked by countries
expanding their territory with separate government entities. 00 The
official coastline of the United States was measured by an ad hoc
committee led by the U.S. Department of State.20 ' However,
despite the best intentions of the federal government to render a
sound decision, U.S. coastal states protested the baseline
delimitations. Following the development of new technology for
deep seabed mining, a number of countries will attempt to
reevaluate their baselines in order to take advantage of the
193 Id.
194 Id. The first off shore point is located 2,000 feet from the focus of the river as it
was at the time of the boundary treaty signature. Id.
195 Alexander, supra note 164, at 534.
196 Lugar, supra note 161. Because the United States is not a member of UNCLOS
III, Russia does not have to actually negotiate with the United States to extend its
maritime boundary.
197 Alexander, supra note 164, at 535.
198 Id. at 535-36. This distance would be somewhat less than 200 nautical miles. Id.
at 536.
199 Id. The Convention presents guidelines for individual countries to follow none
of which are absolute.
200 Id. (explaining that this trend has been seen in the United States in regards to
locating the baseline and maritime boundaries).
201 Alexander, supra note 164, at 536. The United States interacted with the coastal
states and the federal government to locate the official U.S. baseline. Id.
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potential new mining industry.20 2
VII. Territorial Sea
Article 3 of UNCLOS allows every state to set its territorial
sea limits up to twelve nautical miles measured from the baseline
as determined by the Convention." 3 The concept of the "territorial
sea" creates two, perhaps conflicting, interests-"[the] exclusive
interest of the individual coastal states and the inclusive interest of
the international community.,
20 4
The acceptance of Article 3 is not universal. 205  The United
States has challenged those countries that do not accept the
territorial sea limit by either protesting the country's actions or
asserting the U.S. navigation rights against the excessive territorial
claims of other countries.20 6
The issue of innocent passage is raised by the concept of the
territorial sea.20 7 In interpreting Article 21 of UNCLOS, some
countries have adopted the view that they may, with due notice,
create regulations and laws that restrict innocent passage through
their territorial sea.20 8  The greatest restriction in these liberal
navigation rules on innocent passage for the United States is the
demand for prior notification and permission for the passage of a
U.S. war vessel. 20 9  The Convention recognizes the right of
passage through the territorial seas, allowing for overflight and
202 Id.
203 GALDORISI & VIENNA supra note 8, at 145. Most attempts to expand beyond the
expressed limit have been curtailed by the United States. Id.
204 Shekhar Ghosh, The Legal Regime of Innocent Passage Through the Territorial
Sea in LAW OF THE SEA 37, 37 (Hugh Caminos ed., 1980).
205 GALDORISI & VIENNA, supra note 8, at 145. When the Convention came into
force, seventeen countries claimed their territorial sea expanded beyond twelve nautical
miles. In fact, Ecuador and Peru indicate that their territorial sea extends for some 200
nautical miles. Id.
206 Id.
207 Id.
208 Id. For example, in 1981, Finland limited the innocent passage through certain
areas of its territorial sea and mandated compulsory pilotage service for all vessels.
Also, the United States adamantly protested the Soviet restrictions that led to the 1988
bumping occurrence. Id. at 145-46.
209 GALDORISI & VIENNA, supra note 7, at 146. Other demands attached to the
innocent war vessel passage are the limitation of the number of vessels permitted to pass
and limits or prohibitions of nuclear-powered vessels. Id.
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navigational freedom of the high seas.21° Currently, the lenient
navigation rules include the immutable legal right for ships
and aircrafts to travel the international straits without coastal
states' interference. 21 1 However, some UNCLOS III members may
propose to amend the concept of freedom of navigation to allow
the exclusion of vessels.212 As a member of UNCLOS III, the
United States would be able to block such negative amendments. 2
1 3
Further, if it joined UNCLOS, the United States could potentially
prevent or decrease "the backsliding" by states that have
previously abandoned their excessive maritime claims, yet wish to
reinstitute those claims given that the United States is currently not
a member.2 1
4
UNCLOS addresses five different kinds of international straits,
each with its own distinct legal regime resulting in some confusion
with regard to addressing international navigation. 215 The varying
number of the strait regimes has led to the contiguousness of the
international straits passage.21 6 Coastal states want to profit from
the necessity of the international straits by attaching conditions to
their usage.217 In these cases, the maritime nations have no
recourse except to allow the restrictions on the passage.2 8
210 Sandalow, supra note 2, at 3.
211 GALDORISI & VIENNA, supra note 8, at 147. This concept has not been
universally accepted, and certain states are attempting to create restrictions against
passage which would not be in compliance with the UNCLOS. Id.
212 Sandalow, supra note 2, at 3.
213 Id.
214 Id.
215 GALDORISI &VIENNA, supra note 8, at 148. Article 37 controls the regulation
transit passage of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) connecting to
another part of either. Article 45(1)(b) refers to the non-suspendable innocent passage
between an EEZ and a territorial sea of a foreign nation. Article 38(1) regulates the non-
suspendable innocent passage between an EEZ and high sea with another part where the
strait is formed by an island of a state bordering the strait and its mainland. Article 35(c)
regulates the straits as a whole or in part by pre-existing regulations such as the Turkish
straits. Article 54 regulates straits that are regulated by archipelagic sealanes passage in
archipelagic waters. Id.
216 GALDORISI &VIENNA, supra note 8, at 148.
217 Id.
218 Id. For example, Yemen required all warships and aircrafts to obtain permission
before passing through the strait of Bab el Mandeb. The Soviet Union and Canada
sought to impose restrictions for the passage of the Northeast and Northwest Passes
respectively. Id.
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UNCLOS requires continuous negotiations regarding the rights to
passage and duties associated with straits.219  Article 41 of
UNCLOS permits states bordering the straits to regulate the traffic
of the passage by setting up sea lanes promoting navigational
safety.22°
Another aspect of the territorial seas is the contiguous zone set
aside in Article 33.22 1 The coastal state has the authority to prevent
and punish infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration, or
sanitary law. 222 The contiguous zone may extend out to no more
than twenty-four miles measured from the same baseline as the
territorial sea. 223 These twenty-four miles of contiguity allow for
passages and overflight, resembling the freedom of the seas
doctrine. 224  Excessive claims against military activities in the
contiguous zone are burdensome to the United States in that the
restrictions on the territorial sea leave the contiguous zone the next
best place to set up naval forces.225 Coastal states have the
authority to regulate the territorial sea.226  If it does not get
authorization to travel through the territorial seas, the United
States is left to negotiate navigation in the contiguous zone.227
VIII. The High Seas
As Galdorisi and Vienna explain in their book, "[f]reedom to
fish on the high seas is no longer an unfettered right. It has been
219 Id. at 149.
220 Id. The safety schemes must be in compliance with international standards and
the negotiations should follow the International Maritime Organization scheme. Article
42 allows bordering states to control pollution and noxious substances such as oil and oil
waste. Article 43 appears to be the catch-all provision allowing the maintenance of the
straits via navigational or safety aids and "any other improvements to aid in the
prevention, reduction, and control of pollution from ships." Id.
221 GALDORISI &VIENNA, supra note 8, at 147. Article 33 allows for a contiguous
zone that runs adjacent to the territorial sea. Id. at 149.
222 UNCLOS, supra note 1, art. 33.
223 GALDORISI & VIENNA, supra note 7, at 147.
224 Id. Some sixteen nations including Bangladesh, Haiti, Iran, Sudan, Venezuela,
and Yemen expanded the principle of the contiguous zone to contain a national security
element, thereby restricting all warships and military aircraft. Id.
225 Id. The organization of the navy includes the peacetime presence, the show of
force, humanitarian operations, evacuation operations, and actual combat.
226 See Sandalow, supra note 2 at 4.
227 Id.
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made subject to several conditions, including the fundamental
obligation for governments to cooperate in the conservation and
management of the high seas living resources." '228 The area of the
high seas was not a controversial topic to be discussed in the
Convention, because theoretically the high seas belong to the
international community as a whole.229 However, the United
States maintains a great domestic interest in the high seas because
of the relatively large extent to which the high seas are involved in
its various activities.' Article 87 of the Convention permits all
ships and aircrafts (including military and warships) to move about
the high seas.23' With the freedom of the seas, a state must act in
consideration of the interests of other states and must not involve
itself with activities that unreasonably interfere with the interest of
the other states' freedom of the high seas.232 Prior to the
Convention, fishing in the high seas was controllable and limitless.
Now the states are under a legal obligation to conserve living
resources and are forced to cooperate with other governments to
conserve. 233
U.S. navigation on the high seas is affected by its non-
ratification of UNCLOS III. For example, if a U.S. naval task
force had to rush from the Persian Gulf to a crisis along the North
Korean peninsula, it could be forced to detour 3,000 miles around
Indonesia. 234 Another example is the barring of U.S. tankers from
the Strait of Hormuz-the strait in which most American foreign
oil is shipped-by Iran.235 Finally, Russia could institute fishing
trawlers off the coast of Alaska that would take millions of tons of
228 GALDORISI & VIENNA, supra note 8, at 153 (citing Christopher Joyner, Ocean
Fisheries, Unites States' Interests and the Law of the Sea Convention, Address at the
Georgetown University Law Center Symposium, Implementing the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (Jan. 1995)).
229 Id.
230 Id.
231 Id. The movement includes the operation on, under, and over the high seas.
Even the operation of military exercises, surveillance, intelligence gathering and
munitions testing is allowed on the high seas. Id.
232 GALDORISI & VIENNA, supra note 8, at 153. In other words, the state must
balance its interest with the interests of other states when it utilizes its freedom of the
high seas. Id.
233 Id.
234 See Lugar, supra note 161.
235 Id.
[Vol. 31
LAW OF THE SEA AND U.S. PROPERTY INTERESTS
salmon found in American waters. 236 None of these things would
be possible if the United States ratifies UNCLOS III. UNCLOS
III may aid the United States in ensuring that the naval ships and
submarines can navigate freely along the high seas, that cargo
ships and tankers may navigate along the world's sea lanes, and
that the United States retains control over the resources found in
the deep sea.237 As long as the United States remains a nonparty, it
will not be able to rely on the protections provided by UNCLOS
111.238
IX. Exclusive Economic Zones and Fisheries 239
The exclusive economic zones were the result of relations
between distant-water fishing states and developed and developing
coastal states. 240 After the failure of the Second Convention on the
Law of the Sea in 1960, a number of developed coastal states
established nine miles of exclusive fishing beyond the then three-
mile territorial sea.241 To deflect the pressures of distant-water
fleets, some developed coastal states claimed to purposefully
chose the nine-mile territorial sea.242 Others-like Chile, Ecuador,
and Peru-were feeling pressure from the American tuna industry
as a distant-water fleet near their coasts, so they extended their
zones to 200 miles.243 Until 1966, the United States refused to
accept the national zone of nine miles of exclusive fishing; but, in
236 Id.
237 Id.
238 Id.
239 GALDORISI & VIENNA, supra note 8, at 157. The third committee of UNCLOS
focused on how to make exclusive economic zones work and how to allot authority and
control to first and second World countries. The Third Committee dealt with an array of
subjects and many in the international community questioned its importance; however in
the 1960s, the international community suffered from non-domestic major ship-related
accidents involving oil tankers and freighters polluting the shores and EEZs. Although
most of the pollution was not caused primarily by domestic ships, preventing, mitigating,
and cleaning up oil spills became a major domestic concern for the general international
community. Id. at 25-30.
240 See Tommy Koh, The Exclusive Economic Zone, 30 MALAY. L. REv. 1 (1988).
241 Id. at 1. The first country to try this was Iceland which resulted in the "cod war"
between Iceland and the United Kingdom. Id.
242 Id. at 8.
243 Id. The international community found the 200-mile extension to be an area in
which the coastal state would only have sovereignty over the resources. Id. Kenya
coined the new limits the exclusive economic zone. Id. at 9.
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1966, the United States shifted directions and created an additional
nine-mile exclusive fishing zone for itself.244 The United States
claimed that it had the same jurisdictional rights over the fishery
zone as it did over the territorial sea.245 The United States changed
its view of the fishery zone because it realized that the New
England states and Alaska were very much dependent on the
fishing industry.246 The fishing industry is vital to the economy of
those states and without the fishery zones, those states were
competing with foreign fishermen.2 4 ' At the same time, the United
States also has distant water fishermen that would be competing
with the foreign fleets in other areas outside U.S. jurisdiction. 248 In
such cases, the developing countries feared that the freedom of the
high seas and the territorial sea were only to benefit the developed
nations because it allowed those developed nations, like the United
States, to fish close to their shore while the developing countries
could not fish off the coast of the developed states.249
In establishing the exclusive economic zone (EEZ), the
economic rights a coastal state has within that EEZ must also be
established. The EEZ is commonly known as the 200-mile fishery
zone that balances the rights of coastal states and the rights of the
other states.2  Coastal states have the sovereign rights to the
natural resources (living and nonliving) found and jurisdiction
over the marine scientific research in the EEZ.251' The most
important living resources found in the EEZ are lobster, scallops,
crayfish, oysters, shrimp, and clams, whereas the most important
nonliving resources are hydrocarbons and gas.252 With regard to
fisheries, some scholars have argued that the coastal state does not
have the exclusive rights to the fish found in the EEZ, but it does
244 Id. at 2. It was recorded at the Second LOS Convention that the United States
was against the use of the exclusive fishing zones of twelve miles.
245 See Koh, supra note 240, at 2. Only foreign states recognized by the United
States were allowed to fish in the fishery zones.
246 Id. at 3.
247 Id.
248 Id.
249 Id.
250 FRIEDHEIM, supra note 24, at 135.
251 Id. at 135 (citing UNCLOS, supra note 1, art. 56).
252 Koh, supra note 240, at 9.
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have preferential rights.253 The Convention places a legal duty on
coastal states to give to other states the difference between the
total allowable catch and its own harvesting capacity-the surplus
of fish goes to other states.
254
Almost ninety percent of living resources, such as fish, are
found within 200 nautical miles and are thereby under the
255ThCojurisdiction of the individual states. The Convention imposes a
duty to conserve and cooperate in the conservation of the fisheries
populations found in the high seas and EEZ. 256 "Fish" is a non-
specific term and includes tuna, "straddling stocks," salmon, and
even some species of whale.257 Under the Convention, the Unites
States would have the authority to regulate fisheries in the largest
most resource-rich EEZ in the world.258 As a coastal state, the
United States would have the exclusive right to explore and exploit
all that is found within its EEZ. 259 The exploitation includes the
production of energy through hydroelectricity via water, currents,
and winds.260 A coastal state has jurisdiction over the EEZ to the
establish and use artificial islands, installations, and structures.261
In addition, a coastal state has jurisdiction over marine scientific
research and over the protection of preservation of the marine
environment.262 A coastal state also has the obligation to "ensure
through proper conservation and management measures that the
maintenance of the living resources in the exclusive economic
zone is not endangered by over-exploitation. 263 Finally, a coastal
state is under obligation of the Convention to promote the
253 Id.
254 Id.
255 Taft, supra note 49.
256 Id. at 2.
257 Id. The Author recognizes the fact that whales are mammals, not fish.
258 Id.
259 Id. at 4.
260 See id. The sources of energy are found in the waves, temperature changes,
tides, offshore winds, salinity gradients, and ocean biomass. Tidal power is one of the
most probable of the sources. Tidal power is created by building a dam across a bay
where, when the high tide occurs, the water passes through the dam into the bay. When
the tide recedes, the water will pass through the dam, driving its turbines. Canada has
the world's largest tidal power dam at the Bay of Fundy. Id.
261 Koh, supra note 240, at 10.
262 Id.
263 Id. at 11 (citing art. 61, para. 2).
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optimum use of the living resources located in the EEZ.264
Over fifty percent of the population of the United States lives
within fifty miles of the coastline.265  Close to one-half of the
coastal finfish stock within the United States is overexploited.266
Within the finfish stock, thirty-six species are fully exploited. 26 7 It
is estimated to take five to twenty years to replenish the finfish
stock, even if fishing halted immediately.268 Certain prized
commercial fish are not only threatened with exploitation, but also
complete extinction.269
Outside of its coastline, the United States is suffering the
effects from highly migratory species and straddling stocks.27 °
One of the most profitable areas in the fish industry for the United
States is the tuna market.27' On average, the United States
fishermen catch "hundreds of millions of dollars" worth of tuna
outside the U.S. EEZ.2 72 There continues to be a clash between the
United States and Latin America over the tuna catch off the Latin
American Coast.2 73 Diminishing returns, the significance of the
fishery industry, and the complexity of the conservation effort
have prompted the United States to take an active role in the
international community to safeguard against the depletion of one
of its more profitable industries.274
264 Id.
265 GALDORISI & VIENNA, supra note 8, at 157.
266 Id. at 157.
267 Id.
268 Id.
269 See id. With too few of ground fish, red snapper, swordfish, striped bass, and
Atlantic blue fin tuna, there is no justification for any of the species to be caught. Id.
270 Id. at 158. Straddling stocks are those rare species that are located adjacent and
beyond the EEZ. Highly migratory fish are those that may be born in one EEZ and
migrate thousands of miles to another EEZ and are caught in another coastal state EEZ.
Id.
271 Id. Tuna consumption makes up almost twenty-five percent of the total volume
of edible fish imported into the United States. Id.
272 GALDORISI &VIENNA, supra note 8, at 158.
273 Id. Other fish of significance to the United States is swordfish, pollock in the
Bering Sea, marlins, sailfish, and other billfish for the recreational fisherman. The
harvest of the Atlantic bluefin tuna has severely diminished in recent years. The stock of
swordfish has decreased so drastically that there is no longer the recreational sword-
fishing sport. The pollock harvest was nearly 1.5 million metric tons in 1989 and
plummeted to 11,000 tons within three years. Id.
274 Id.
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Originally, the United States did not want the highly migratory
species within the EEZ of a coastal state to be under the
jurisdiction of that state. The United States believed that any
state that is able to fish for a certain species should be allowed to
do so in another state's EEZ as long as international agreements
regulated such action.276 Then, in 1990, the United States felt
the economic pains of the diminishing tuna population and
claimed jurisdiction over the tuna effective January 1992.277 The
management of anadromous species, such as salmon, is of
particular importance to the United States.278  The Convention
allows for the states within the spawning area of the anadromous
species to be responsible for the management and conservation of
that species. 279 Finally, when a stock migrates outside of the state
of origin EEZ into another, that state must cooperate with the state
of origin for the management and conservation of that species.28°
The United States should ratify UNCLOS III to protect its
property interests surrounding the Alaskan coast and its
economy.281  Alaska is more than half of the coastline of the
United States and is the only U.S. coastline on the Arctic Ocean.282
As discussed earlier, Russia has recently laid claim to the Artic
seabed beyond its 200-mile EEZ.283 Without U.S. ratification,
Russia will be able to pursue its claims without opposition from
America. 2s4  At 1,000 miles in length, the Alaskan coast is
extremely valuable to the U.S. fishing and shipping industries.285
275 Id. at 159.
276 Id.
277 Id. The regulation of highly migratory species is subject to the United Nations
Conference on Fisheries and requires input of the United States based on its own policy
decisions. Id.
278 GALDORISI & VIENNA, supra note 8, at 160. The term "anadromous species"
refers to those which return to their place of birth to spawn in the rivers. Id.
279 Id. The Convention also gives primary interests of those species to those states.
However, if a state would be economically adversely affected, efforts are made to allow
fishing beyond the EEZ for that state. Id.
280 Id. at 160.
281 Lugar, supra note 161.
282 It's Time to Ratify Law of the Sea Treaty, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Jan. 14,
2004, http:/Iugar.senate.gov/sfrc/opeds.html#navyl.
283 Id.
284 Id.
285 Id.
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Due to global warning and the resultant melting of Arctic ice, the
Arctic Ocean is becoming more accessible and intercontinental
maritime shipping in the area is increasing.286 The United States
will be able to extend the continental shelf and claim resources on
or under the sea floor on the Chukchi Cap in the Arctic and the
"doughnut hole" in the Bering Sea.
2 87
UNCLOS III encourages coastal states to use their living
resources wisely, since such resources are required as sources
of animal protein used to combat world hunger.288 Coastal
states have a duty to "ensure through proper conservation and
management measures that the maintenance of the living resources
in the EEZ is not endangered by over-exploitation" and to
"promote the objective of the optimum utilization of the living
resources in the EEZ. 289 The optimum yield requirement allows
coastal state to take into account all the germane environmental,
economic, social, and technological factors in acquiring the
optimum yield of fish in hopes of curtailing the possibility of a
catastrophe ending in a species' extinction.290
The Convention gives various ways in which the coastal state
may arrive at an optimum utilization yield.29' Of course, a coastal
state should consult the fishery organizations, taking into account
the most up-to-date scientific research.292 A coastal state must be
provided with guidelines to help maintain the populations of the
harvested species in order to maintain stability of that species in
the environment.293 When the population of a certain fish has
declined drastically, the optimum yield may be lowered to
accommodate the need for species stability.294 The optimum yield
286 Id.
287 Lugar, supra note 161.
288 Koh, supra note 240, at 11. There is a difference between optimum and
maximum utilization. The maximum utilization is greater than optimal and could cause
the extinction of a certain species of animal. Id.
289 Id.
290 Id.
291 Id.
292 Id. at 12. The fisheries organization is typically the Food and Agricultural
Organization.
293 Koh, supra note 240, at 12.
294 Id. at 13. Oil spillages that result in damage to a certain species may also be
taken into account when lowering the optimum yield of a harvested species. Id. at 12.
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must also consider the interdependence of certain fish on
another. 295 Finally, after determining the allowable optimum yield,
the coastal state must then determine its harvesting capacity.296 if
the coastal state's harvesting capacity is below the optimum catch,
then any surplus must be doled out to other states.297
While other subjects were to be discussed in the Third
Committee of UNCLOS, defining coastal states' relationships with
scientists and shippers became its focus. 298  Both shippers and
scientists wanted to have access to the EEZ waters, but did not
claim a territorial right to any of the EEZ.299  Shippers of goods
caused a potential pollution problem in the EEZ.300 The scientists
present problems as well; they are eager to experiment in the
ocean, causing harm to the living creatures and even more
accurately collecting data that could be harmful to the EEZ.3 °1
The Third Committee designed its international decision-
295 Id. The coastal state must then make sure that the yield for one fish species does
not force the decrescendo of the more dependent species. Id. at 13. An example of this
would be where an EEZ has an optimum level of herring and not a large number of cod.
Id. By removing herring, the coastal state has also put the cod in danger because the cod
feeds off the herring. Id.
296 Id.
297 UNCLOS, supra note 1, arts. 62, 69, and 70. The first countries to receive the
surplus are the landlocked and otherwise geographically disadvantaged. The coastal
state may charge equitable fees for the surplus. Id. Articles 69 and 70 give a more in-
depth look into the rights of the landlocked and geographically disadvantaged. Id.
298 FRIEDHEIM, supra note 24, at 174.
299 Id. at 176.
300 Id. at 178. The EEZ is known as the most valuable and productive location for
living resources. Id. at 174. In the collection of positive data, the detriment in the EEZ
is caused when the positive information reaches the international community and the
states try to take advantage of the EEZ, leaving it over-exploited. See id. at 178. The
second circumstance is the collection of negative data in which the states are no longer
attracted to the EEZ and creates a loss of economy for the coastal state. See id.
301 FRIEDHEIM, supra note 24, at 174. By researching the EEZ, scientists may
threaten the coastal-state sovereignty by learning too much. In one aspect this scientific
research may reveal great discoveries in minerals and other sea-bed resources which
would lead to all other states entering into the EEZ laying claim to the research areas.
UNCLOS allows the coastal state to have jurisdiction over the research conducted within
its EEZ, but also requires these coastal states to grant consent to outside scientific
research in the coastal states' EEZ. Many developing coastal states view marine research
as way for other states to gain political or economic power over other states and look to
gained scientific knowledge as a way to be controlled instead of the prospect of
developing greater scientific knowledge through research. GALDORISI & VIENNA, supra
note 8, at 163.
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making on the world ecosystem after World War 1.302 Because of
the vastness of the pollution problem, the committee really focused
on two dimensions: (1) the internalization of domestic pollutants;
and (2) the ship-related pollutants.3 °3 Article 192 of UNCLOS
indicates that the signatories to the Convention took an oath to
protect and preserve the marine environment.3 4 States promised
to "take all measures that are necessary to ensure that activities
under their jurisdiction or control are so conducted as to not cause
damage by pollution to other states and their environments. 3 5
Developing states were fearful that the Convention obligations
would interfere with their newly sovereign coasts.30 6 They also
feared that developed states were receiving preferential treatment
due to their stature in the international community. 3 7  The
developed states have taken the responsibility to assist the
developing countries in training, clean up, and prevention of
pollution.30 8
Ship-related pollution was difficult to negotiate. 30 9 The coastal
state has the authority to control the surface and subsurface in
order to prevent or lessen pollution near the coastal shore.
Consequently, that authority could also lead to the coastal state
preventing any movement within the EEZ.3 ° The territorialists
were in favor of doling out another 200 miles to their control;
however, the partimonialists were not in favor of the de facto
territorial sea, preferring assurance that forfeiting the 200 miles
302 FRIEDHEIM, supra note 24, at 179.
303 Id. at 178. Internalization occurs when the coastal state takes responsibility for
the pollutions caused by it. Id.
304 Id. at 182.
305 Id.; see also UNCLOS, supra note 1, art. 194. The signatories also agree to
cooperate in the implementation of international rules and to consider the risks and
effects of pollutants in the marine environment. Id.
306 FRIEDHEIM, supra note 24, at 182-83.
307 Id. The benefits come from international organizations in the special services,
technical assistance, and funds to help prevent pollution. Id.
308 Id. at 183-84. The Articles dealing with internal pollution induce states to be
good members of the international community, but they do not give any jurisdictional
rights or enforcement mechanism for the management of the pollution. Id.
309 Id. at 184.
310 Id. If this was allowed to happen, it would place a limitation on the freedom of
the seas doctrine and the EEZ would become a de facto territorial sea. Id.
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would not eliminate their rights.31
The United States and Canada quarreled over vessel pollution
standards and the relationship between the two developed
nations.312 The main issue presented in the Third Committee was
how to bring oil discovered off the coast of Alaska to the
market. 3 3  As the United States saw it, it had three options: (1)
bring the oil to market on the West Coast of the United States by
tanker across the Beaufort and Chuckchi Seas, and then across the
Bering Strait; (2) bring the oil by pipeline from the North Slope
across Alaska and Canada to either the Canadian or U.S. coastal
ice-free border and then by tanker to the West Coast and Gulf
ports; or (3) bring the oil by tanker east across the Beaufort Sea
through the Northwest Passage.3 4  In 1969, an experiment was
conducted in which the S.S. Manhattan was sent on a voyage
through the Northwest Passage. 35  The Canadian government
had been informed about the planning of the experiment but
was not aware of the actual voyage eastward through the
Northwest Passage.31 6  The United States only viewed the
Canadian sovereignty over the islands and some of the territorial
sea in the Northwest Passage, but the United States did not
see a need to request permission from the Canadians to conduct
the experiment. 3 7  The U.S. assertion was technically correct;
however, international custom would require the United States to
ask for Canadian approval when making transit.318 Canada had
311 FRIEDHEIM, supra note 24, at 184. The territorialists were those in favor of
extending the twelve mile zone to 200 miles. Id. The patrimonialists were those in favor
of creating a separate exclusive economic zone. Id.
312 Id. at 189. The conflicts between the nations dealt with the nature of the
prescribed regulation and the authority and control to regulate. Id.
313 Id. In the 1960s oil was discovered on the North Slope of Alaska. Id.
314 Id. First conceptualized in the sixteenth century, the Northwest Passage is
considered the water routes through the Arctic Archipelago, North Canada, and the
northern coast of Alaska between the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans. The first commercial
ship to make a successful transit was the S.S. Manhattan in 1969. In 1988, the United
States and Canada addressed the question of arctic sovereignty, agreeing to allow the
U.S. icebreaking tankers to cross the arctic waters only after receiving Canadian
approval. Id.
315 FRIEDHEIM, supra note 24, at 189.
316 Id. The report of the action went to press and the backlash soon followed. Id.
317 Id.
318 Id. In laymen's terms, if one needs to cross over into the neighbor's yard to
retrieve a ball or a pet, common courtesy would require that individual to ask her
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never defined the jurisdiction in the Arctic, and the United States
wanted Canada to remain in that position.319 The United States
sought to avoid jurisdictional claims of straits used for
international navigation because those claims would limit the
United States' ability to navigate along the Arctic and protect its
coast."' Compromise was easier to find here than in other
situations.32'
The Canadians decided to turn to UNCLOS 111.322 Canada
wanted UNCLOS III negotiations to enforce its right to regulate
the pollution in the Arctic waters.323 Canada's issue of pollution-
control regulations in the EEZ was brought to the forefront of
UNCLOS III, and a bilateral agreement with the United States was
also attached. 324  Article 234 sets forth the negotiations of the
bilateral agreement. 325 Both the United States and Canada agreed
that coastal states have the right to create pollution control
regulations in ice-covered areas as long as they do not
discriminate.326 At the end of the negotiations, Canada received
the right to create regulations in specific areas, and the United
States received the unilateral right of a coastal state to create
regulations that involve a restricted area of distinguishable
characteristics.327
neighbor permission to pass through the yard.
319 Id.
320 FRIEDHEIM, supra note 24, at 189.
321 Id. United States-Canadian relations were fairly pleasant and symbiotic.
322 Id. at 190. The dispute lasted beyond the 1982 Convention and the United States
chose the pipeline option. Id. However, Canada used environmental terms in that it
needed to protect the Arctic waters from pollutants and enforced a one hundred mile
pollution prevention zone about the Arctic archipelago. Id.
323 Id. Because this involved negotiations between a weaker nation and its powerful
neighbor, Canada was correct in choosing a multilateral negotiation in which it may fair
better. Id. For example, if the weaker of the two nations gains powerful allies--or a
great number of the smaller nations as allies-the superpower may be forced to change
positions and to accept the weaker one's claim. Id.
324 Id. The bilateral negotiations were attached so as not to monopolize the
committee meeting. Despite its attempt, Canada and its pollution problem was
mentioned frequently throughout the meetings. Id.
325 FRIEDHEIM, supra note 24, at 190.
326 Id.
327 Id. at 190. The United States' view is that Article 234 cannot be used as
precedent to claim jurisdiction over an area that is not covered by ice. Id.
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The United States should also ratify UNCLOS III because of
its economic interests tied to the property found in the ocean. The
U.S. economy thrives on the ocean; more than $700 billon worth
of goods are shipped through the United States annually.
3 28
Almost twenty-five percent of U.S. oil and gas comes from
offshore wells and almost $3 billion generated by the fishing
industry.3 29 Ratification of UNCLOS can help preserve the U.S.
benefits. The navigational provisions of UNCLOS III provide for
stable international trade for the profitability of global
commerce. 330  UNCLOS III allows the United States to have
exclusive authority over the offshore resources found in and on the
EEZ and the continental shelf, thus benefiting the U.S. oil and gas
industry.331 The recognition of the EEZ also allows the United
States to gain full value from the rich fisheries within its
borders.332 Because of the vast economic value of the ocean, the
United States must ratify UNCLOS III to maintain and enhance its
economic prosperity.
X. Marine Scientific Research
333
Marine scientific research plays a pivotal role in understanding
the links between the environmental processes and accurate
decision-making about the coastal waters.334 Marine scientific
research is not defined in the Convention; nonetheless, the
generally accepted definition refers to "those activities undertaken
in the ocean and coastal waters to expand knowledge of the marine
environment and its process. 335
Prior to the first Law of the Sea Conference in 1958, there was
no international constraint on marine scientific research of the
oceans.336 The question of who had the right to regulate marine
328 Sandalow, supra note 2.
329 Id.
330 Id.
331 Id. With the possibility of deep seabed mining, the United States has the
potential for oil and gas production. Id.
332 Id.
333 UNCLOS, supra note 1. Marine scientific research is governed by Articles 40,
87, 143, and 147 of the Convention.
334 GALDORISI & VIENNA, supra note 8, at 163.
335 Id. at 164.
336 John Knauss, Symposium: Law of the Sea: The Effects of the Law of the Sea on
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scientific research became an issue after the allotment of EEZs.337
The rights of foreign vessels in the territorial sea had not included
the right to conduct marine scientific research.338 Due to scientific
advancements, fish harvesting is now so effective that distant
water fishing fleets could effectively deplete a coastal state's
fishery, and thus the establishment of the EEZs are a way to curtail
this exploitation of fish.3 39 The Convention established exclusive
economic zone giving each coastal state jurisdiction over all
resources found in its EEZ.
3 40
More specific restraints on marine research are found in the
Convention on the Continental Shelf of 1958.341 In that
Convention it is stated that the coastal state's consent must be
obtained before doing any research that is occurring along that
state's continental shelf.3 42  If such a request for consent is
proposed by a qualified institution the coastal state should
normally oblige as long as it is purely scientific research into the
"physical or biological characteristics of the continental shelf,
subject to the provision that the coastal state has the right, if it so
desires, to participate or be represented in the research, and that in
any event the results shall be published. 3 43 This implies that the
coastal state controls the resources and thus controls the research
that is done on or about those resources.3" Despite the scientific
community's arguably minimal efforts to negotiate and make it
different, the Convention gives the coastal state almost absolute
power in controlling the marine scientific research of forty percent
of the world's oceans.345
the Future of Marine Scientific Research and of Marine Scientific Research on the
Future Law of the Sea, 45 LA. L. REv. 1201 (1985).
337 Id. at 1202-03.
338 Id. at 1202. Marine scientific research along the continental shelf was subject to
the approval of the coastal state. Id.
339 Id. at 1203.
340 Id.
341 Id.
342 Knauss, supra note 336 at 1.
343 Id.
344 Id. The marine scientific community was not a part of the U.S. delegation to
UNCLOS and was perhaps overlooked. Id.
345 Id. at 1204. The coastal state is authorized to control the "territorial sea,
exclusive economic zones, and ... its continental shelf." Id.
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The Law of the Sea Convention may very well change the way
marine scientific research is done.3 46 There are increasing numbers
of the marine scientists from researching states such as the United
States that are developing joint ventures with other coastal states in
which they would like to do research.347 More importantly, marine
scientific research will have an effect on the Law of the Sea.348
Part XIII permits each state to participate in marine scientific
research.34 9 The Convention then goes on to encourage researchers
not only to publish their findings, but also to circulate those
findings among the member states. This is consistent with U.S.
policy.35 ° Articles 238 to 263 give coastal states the ability to
require consent before marine scientific research is done in their
jurisdictions.35 1 The United States, which pursues "access to other
nations' offshore areas," finds the Convention somewhat
restrictive.3 2 The "implied consent" rule is included in the
Convention language to promote states to respond quickly or else
allow the marine scientific research of another state or
international organization.353 The United States took issue with the
negotiations of this matter in UNCLOS 11.314 The United States
must walk a fine line in creating its policy in the subject matter:
many underdeveloped countries fear that ocean science is only
giving more economic and political powers to already developed
and stable states such.355 With this suspicion of marine scientific
346 Id. at 1207.
347 See id. at 1206-09. An example is the joint venture between University of Sao
Paulo in Brazil and the University of Rhode Island. Id. n. 24.
348 Knauss, supra note 336 at 1211.
349 GALDORISI & VIENNA, supra note 8, at 163.
350 Id.
351 Id. The rights of coastal states are equalized so that they are implemented in a
"predictable and reasonable" manner to endorse "access to research activities." The
Convention allows the coastal state to consent to marine scientific research conducted
within the EEZ and the continental shelf. Id.
352 Id.
353 Id. After the information about the project has been disseminated and six months
have elapsed since the dissemination, the scientific research may begin "unless, within
four months of receipt of the information, the coastal State has informed the research
project that (1) it has withheld consent, (2) the information provided does not conform
with the facts, (3) additional information is required, or (4) outstanding obligations exist
from previous research projects." Id.
354 Id.
355 Id.
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research, individual coastal states may choose to keep whatever
knowledge is gained from a certain project within the state's own
borders and not share such information with the international
community.356 Marine scientific research is important to the
United States.357 With the added complexity of the governing
Convention and the issues resulting in the
ambiguity of the research, it makes it all the more important that
the United States ratify UNCLOS III. By ratifying, the United
States can become an even larger driving force in the field of
international marine scientific research and promote its own
economic advancements.358
XI. Conclusion
The Convention on the Law of the Sea creates an
interdependence of nations with obligations affecting all marine
areas and activities. 35 9 The effectiveness of the legal framework of
this Convention truly depends upon its universal acceptance.
Although the language of the Convention appears to obligate both
parties and non-parties to the Convention, according to the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, the Convention does not
automatically create rights or obligations for third parties.361
356 Id.
Some examples of [the] restrictions [that have been] placed on marine scientific
research are:
Delaying responses to requests for ship clearances;
Requiring data be held in confidence and not placed into the public domain;
Requiring more than one observer to be on board;
Failing of Foreign Ministry to forward the appropriate cruise reports to the
responsible organization.
Id. at 164.
357 Id. Marine scientific research along the U.S. sovereign areas may provide
needed technology for the advancement of the oil and gas industries, as well as the
potential deep seabed mining industry. Id.
358 Id.
359 Satya Nandan, A Report on the Consultations of the Secretary-General, in 1994
RHODES PAPERS: ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION 119, 127
(Myron H. Nordquist & John Norton Moore eds., 1994).
360 See Nikos St. Skourtos, Legal Effects for Parties and Nonparties: The Impact of
the Law of the Sea Convention, in 1994 RHODES PAPERS: ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE LAW
OF THE SEA CONVENTION 187, 203 (Myron H. Nordquist & John Norton Moore eds.,
1994).
361 Id. at 204. In this view, the argument that the United States already follows the
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However, the codification of the customary international law
found in UNCLOS is applicable to the entire international
community. This is because the Vienna Convention allows for
third states to accept the rights and obligations offered under
UNCLOS in accordance of Articles 35 and 36 of the Vienna
Convention.362 While most of the Convention will be applicable as
customary international law, the lack of universal acceptance of
the Convention will leave the legal order of UNCLOS without its
full effect rendering the institutions set by the Convention
powerless.363
With so many uncertainties as to Part XI, it is inevitable that
disputes will arise and there will be need for solutions.
Conceivably, some disputes may be resolved informally;
however, disputes that involve the "seabed beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction will be subject to . . . third-party [dispute
mechanisms.]"3 64 These disputes are subject to the third-party
dispute mechanisms in which the eleven member Seabed Dispute
Chambers have jurisdiction.365  Nonparties, such as the United
States, "will be less able than states Parties to make use of these
third-party dispute mechanisms., 366  In fact, non-parties to the
Convention that have allegedly committed a violation will not be
allowed jurisdiction of a third-party dispute mechanism. 367
Consequently, as a nonmember, the United States will not be able
Convention without ratification is invalid. Although it may follow the guidelines of
customary law, it may not lawfully receive the benefits of the Convention. Id.
362 Riidiger Wolfrum, The Legal Order for the Seas and Oceans, in 1994 RHODES
PAPERS: ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION 161, 166-76 (Myron H.
Nordquist & John Norton Moore eds., 1994). A third party may accept UNCLOS by
extending its territorial sea, declaring an EEZ or any other guideline listed within the
Convention. Id.
363 Id. at 178. UNCLOS legal framework will only take full effect after acceptance
of all states participating in "maritime activities." Id.
364 John E. Noyes, The Third-Party Dispute Settlement Provisions of the 1982
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: Implications for States Parties and for
Nonparties, in 1994 RHODES PAPERS: ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE LAW OF THE SEA
CONVENTION 213, 221 (Myron H. Nordquist & John Norton Moore eds., 1994).
365 Id. at 221. The Seabed Dispute Chambers has jurisdiction over controversial
issues, interpretations, and application of contracts as well as advisory opinions at the
request of the Assembly Council. Id.
366 Id. at231.
367 Id. at 229. Absent a previous agreement bestowing jurisdictional privileges, a
non-party would be barred.
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to vote on the rules, block substantive decisions made by the
Authority, or decide procedures relating to the deep seabed mining
industry.368
As it is written today, UNCLOS tries to balance the
importance of maritime and coastal interests, as well as to
safeguard against the infringement of international transit rights
for ships and aircrafts. 369  Daily issues for the United States
revolve around environment, economy, and the national security.
As in any compromise, there are advantages and disadvantages,
but as a non-party to the Convention, the United States is limiting
its benefits. It is true that as a nonparty the United States has been
able to seek international acceptance and adherence to the
Convention.370 Currently, the United States is enjoying some
stability amongst the international community, most of which is
due to the legal framework of the Convention itself.371
As a military superpower, the United States could heavily rely
on regulations such as the UNCLOS III to provide for military
defense such as navigation and overflight, military presence, and
commercial advantages.372 There is a direct correlation between
the economic interests of the United States and the security
provided by UNCLOS 111. 3 73  In order for the United States to
maintain its political and economic influence, it depends on the
stability of the global market.374  The stability found in the
Convention is also crucial to the exploitation of marine scientific
research in drilling and fishing industries.375
368 See id. at 227-31.
369 Id. at 224.
370 The U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (T. Doc. 103-39): Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 108th Cong. 90 (2003) (statement of John F. Turner,
Assistant Sec'y. of State, Bureau of Oceans and Int'l. Envtl. and Scientific Affairs, Dept.
of State), reprinted in S. EXEC. Doc. No. 108-10, 87 (2004).
371 Id. The legal framework of the Convention indicates that its application is valid
to all parties and most non-parties as customary law. See id.
372 GALDORISI & VIENNA, supra note 8, at 102. Global mobility is important to the
United States and the international community. Id.
373 Id. The success of a stable ocean regime creates national security amongst the
UNCLOS community. Id.
374 Id. The global market is centered around the sea. If universally adopted,
UNCLOS provides for predictability which in turn promotes stability for international
shippers and the commercial cargo market. Id.
375 GALDORISI & VIENNA, supra note 8, at 102.
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The United States was "well served" in making the 1994
Agreement with the international community.37 6 In this compromise
on the governance of the deep seabed, the United States
received a guaranteed membership in the International Seabed
Authority, which allowed it to influence the financial decisions of
the Authority.3 77  The Agreement provides for stability in an
unforeseen-perhaps very lucrative, yet very costly-deep seabed
industry.3 78 Second to the deep seabed industry is that of fisheries
in the EEZ. The Convention recognized the importance of
protecting the fishing industry of its party states. 379 The United
States received great benefits, due to the fact that it controls the
largest EEZ and therefore has substantial discretion in discerning
the "optimum utilization of [the] living resources [found] in the
EEZ."38 The Convention also took into account the United States'
unique position as it relates to anadromous species, giving it
control of protecting the species.38'
Finally, there are numerous incentives for the United States to
join the Convention and discontinue its exclusive reliance on
customary international law.382 By becoming a member, the
United States would be more credible when it invokes treaty
provisions-for instance, when it is in a property "bilateral
disagreement. '3 83 As a member of UNCLOS, the United States
would be able to vote for individuals that would in fact sit on the
Law of the Sea Tribunal to ensure that interpretation of the
Convention is favorable to U.S. policy.384 As it relates to the
freedom of the high seas, the United States would be able to curtail
certain proposals that would adversely affect U.S. military or
376 Id. at 103.
377 Id.
378 Id. at 104.
379 See id.
380 Id. at 105.
381 Id.
382 See The U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (T. Doc. 103-39): Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 108th Cong. 90 (2003) (statement of Hon.
Taft, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dept. of State), reprinted in S. EXEC. Doc. No. 108-10, 88
(2004).
383 Id. at 90.
384 Id. at 90-91.
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navigational interests. 385
The international community is on a fast track and is
continuously changing directions. To maintain its economic
dominance in the international community, the United States must
join the Convention on the Law of the Sea.386 It is in the best
economic, military, and environmental interests for the United
States to join the Convention, and adherence to its guidelines
would encourage others to join, resulting in more stability in the
laws governing the ocean.387
-CANDACE L. BATES
385 Id. at 91.
386 Id.
387 Tumer, supra note 370, at 87.
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